HistWar
HistWar (English zone) => General discussions => Discussion démarrée par: Alfiere le 21 novembre 2013, 09:01:19 am
-
I like very much this campaign.
Someone is interested ?
I am interested in delving into the speech, perhaps finding the way to simulate the campaign with the variant of the North's most active corps (Bellegarde, Kollowrath).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ratisbon_and_vicinity,_17_-_19_April,_1809.jpg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Eckmuhl_April_21.jpg
Hello
-
ReGensburg (in German) or Ratisbon (in English)
-
Thank DominiqueT. (modified the title) ;)
-
The variant start on 19 th april,with Davout movement out of Ratisbon,but with Bellagarde near to Kelheim(variant).
I want use two satellite map 80km x 60km ,for draw movements day for day and some of 30km.
I have to read for historical forces,need a lot of time (wait a book).
Hello
-
take a look also here...for some discussions...
http://napbc.freeforums.org/variant-historical-ratisbon-campaign-t6186.html
hello
Thanks for all your hard work Alfiere :!:
I replied to your post on the NBC forum regarding the campaign, with some ideas.
Best Regards
zu
-
ok , zuPferd ,very good. ;)
After a little simulation with Bellagarde at Kelheim(variant) , austrains very strong at Tengen .
Anyway i wait a book for a atempt to build historical OOBs and forces ,need a lot of time.
-
ok , zuPferd ,very good. ;)
After a little simulation with Bellagarde at Kelheim(variant) , austrains very strong at Tengen .
Anyway i wait a book for a atempt to build historical OOBs and forces ,need a lot of time.
I could try to help by sending you the appendix to the book , a word of caution not all the 'effective'
number of soldiers x regiment are depicted so further reading in line with Orel's OOB/Nazfiger would
not produce any better answers since the actual historical records are lost or not legible.
90% of the information is there so no real problem.
zu
-
Hello zu Pferd
Thank anyway,but no need,i have the book in two or three days.
;)
-
Hello zu Pferd
Thank anyway,but no need,i have the book in two or three days.
Oh good, you're going to enjoy it, it is well written as in the narrative as well as technical, lots
of useful information in the appendix and a great companion to 'With Eagles with Glory' by the
same author or the German allies of Napoleon and how and where they fought they fought in the
1809 campaign.
Which brings me back to your 'workaholic skill' when working of some project for HistWar :D
and the 1809 campaign and a campaign map I happen to have a copy of Kevin Zucker's '1809 Napoleon's
Danube Campaign' a board game, but what is truly remarkable is the campaign map of the entire Danube
from Regensburg and environs to Vienna - Fischamend (14 east of Vienna) does not include Gyor/Raab area.
each exagon is 2 miles 9.32 exes-18.64 miles = 30 km , Ive attached a reduced size pic.
Take a look and see what you think easy and quick enough to generate the size of map to play battle on
in HistWar and draw in the features : height 2 colors green woods, rivers towns and villages with names pontoon crossing points.
Let me know what you think and I'll send you the larger version 180cm x 56 cm in bitmap or jpg
I have no worry about copyright since its going to stay within a small group.
ciao
zu
-
Hello zu Pferd
for me it is already a titanic work read the book in English,understand it and build the OOB for the campaign. :mrgreen:
Did this perhaps it will be possible to simulate the variation of destruction of Davout's rearguard at Tengen and its possible developments.
I'm not sure we'll see.
For me it is already enough.
Thank anyway
-
Hello zu Pferd
for me it is already a titanic work read the book in English,understand it and build the OOB for the campaign. :mrgreen:
Did this perhaps it will be possible to simulate the variation of destruction of Davout's rearguard at Tengen and its possible developments.
I'm not sure we'll see.
For me it is already enough.
Thank anyway
Hi I didn't mean to scare you as well, because I'm scared as well. The map of the valley is huge 290 km @@
Just to be enterprising I worked out 30 km map of the Abensberg all too familiar theater of operations.
(just a rough work and already done even with scilab)
instead -3 actual battles can take place on this map : Abensberg ,Teugen-Hausen , Eggmuhl.
It was very quick to draw, the water obstacle is the Gross Laber river on the Austrian's back.
3 stone bridges 1 wood bridge and possibly a ford between Lanquaid and Eulenbach.
or if too complicated because same area will without fail have more than one river on it
then a brook to delineate a course of water.
What will be moving on the -campaign map will be flag with Corps #/or flag only if FOG is on
(just an idea) standard rules for scouting which have been used by most HW Clubs present here.
with a floating 30 km template its easy, all there is left is for the armies to move.
Just an idea
I know you are working on something else, buona lettura e buon lavoro :D
zu
-
Nice map. ;)
I already posted some sat maps at NBC (150km and 80km and also 30km).
Missed only the Gross Laber river,but i can draw it in a second time.
Because will be a variant i want use the 150km map to draw possible movements and build a custom map (10-15km) when is need for the battles.
The variant is the destruction Davout rearguard at Tengen.(battle vs Hoenzollern with help of 1 reserve austrian corp)
After the Nap orders in progress at 19 April 1809 executed anyway, the question is 'What makes Nap and Charles?'
I decide myself with new french and austrians orders,not taking in account enemy orders :roll:, to draw with big nap,but with forum help, the orders can be discussed and changed after some discussions.For to find the better strategy for both sides.
and play the battles in solo mode both side,too slow play vs a opponent .
This is my main idea ...then will see.
Hello zu Pferd
-
Ciao Alfiere,
I follow your reasoning regarding the background behind your variant scenario
I saw the maps at NBC great effort perhaps you can do one for the Zucker map :twisted:
Both men read the same books believe it or not, however le destine preferred Bonaparte
if you are big on destiny then you start to see that Napoleon was an original at least
when it comes down to what he did best:
(analogies)
he has hardly ever been discussed without
a side glance at Caesar and Alexander the first being unacceptable and the second being
correct (Spangler)
And when it comes to analogies Frederick the Great compared the French to the Macedonians
under Philip and the Germans to the Greeks
(romantic)
Alexander and Napoleon were romantics; though they stood on the threshold of Civilization and in its cold clean air, the one fancied himself an Achilles the other read Werther.
Caesar on the contrary was a pure man of fact gifted with immense understanding (Spangler)
Napoleon burned with 'a great duty to Civilization'.
(imperialism)
Napoleon had in his graver moments a strong feeling for the deep logic of world-becoming and
in such moments could divine to what extent he was, and to what extent he had a destiny.
(from his letters- beginning of the Russian Campaign)" I feel myself driven towards an end that I do not know. As soon as I shall have reached it, as soon as I shall become unnecessary, an atom will suffice to shatter me"...here certainly not a pragmatist (Spengler)
here is the passage that send shivers up the spine
' The tragic in Napoleon's life-which still awaits discovery by a poet great enough to comprehend it
and shape it-was that he, who rose into effective being by fighting British policy and the British
spirit which that policy so eminently represented, completed by the very fighting the continental
victory of this spirit, which thereupon became strong enough, in the guise of "liberated nations"
to overpower him and to send him to St Helena to die.
It was not Napoleon who originated the expansion principle. That had arisen out of the Puritanism
of Cromwell's milieu which called into life the British Colonial Empire. Transmitted through the
schooled intellects of Rousseau and Mirabeau to the Revolutionary armies, of which English philosophical ideas were essentially the driving force, it became their tendency even from that day of Valmy. It was not Napoleon who formed the idea, but the idea that formed Napoleon, and when he came to the throne he was obliged to pursue it further against the only power, namely England
whose purpose was the same as his own. The Empire was a creation of French blood but of English style. It was in London again that Locke, Shaftesbury, Samuel Clarke and above all Bentham built
up the theory of "European Civilization"--the Western Hellenism which Bayle, Voltaire, and Rousseau carried to Paris. Thus it was in this England of Parliamentarianism, business morality
and journalism that Valmy, Marengo, Jena, Smolensk and Liepzig were fought, and in all these
battles it was the English spirit that defeated the French culture of the West.
The French Consul had no intention of incorporating west Europe in France, his prime object was--note the Alexander idea on the threshold of every Civilization!--to replace the British Colonial
Empire for a French one. Thereby, French preponderance in the western-culture region would have been placed on a practically unassailable foundation; it would have been the Empire of Charles the V on which the sun never set, but managed from Paris after all, in spite of Columbus and Philip, and organized as an economic-military instead of an ecclesiastical-chivalric unit.
So far reaching, probably was the destiny that was in Napoleon. But the peace of Paris in 1763
had already decided the question against France, and Napoleon's great plans, time and again
came to grief in petty incidents.
At Acre a few guns were landed in the nick of time from the British Warships.
At the Peace of Amiens, when the wole of the Mississippi Basin was still amongst his assets
and he was in close touch with the Maratha powers that were resisting the British progress in India
but again a minor naval incident (Linois to Pondichery in 1803) obliged him to abandon the whole of a carefully prepared enterprise; and lastly when Dalmatia, Corfu and all of Italy he had made the
Adriatic a French lake, with a view of another expedition to the East, and was negotiating with the
Shah of Persia, for action against India and whose aid would infallibly have induced its success.
It was only after the failure of all extra-European combinations, that he chose as his ultima-ratio
in the battle against England, the incorporation of Germany and Spain, and so raising against himself his own English Revolutionary ideas, the very ideas of which he had been the vehicle, he
took the step that made him "no longer necessary".
A " United States of Europe" actualized through Napoleon as a founder of a romantic and popular
military monarchy is the analogue of the Realm of the Diadochi; when actualized as a twenty first century economic organism, by a matter of fact Caesar, it will be the counter part of the imperium
Romanum. These are incidentals, but they are a picture of history.
But Napoleon's victories and defeats (which always hide a victory of England and Civilization over Culture) his Imperial dignity, his fall, the Grande Nation, the episodic liberation of Italy (in 1796,
as in 1859, essentially no more than a change of political costume for a people long since become
insignificant) the destruction of the Gothic ruin of the Roman-German Empire, are mere surface
phenomena...the storming of the Bastille, Valmy, Austerlitz, Waterloo and the rise of Prussia thus
correspond to the Classical-history facts of Chaeronea, Gaugamela(Arbela), Alexander 's Indian expedition and the Roman victory at Sentinum (295 B.C.)
AND WE BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND THAT IN WARS AND POLITICAL CATASTROPHES--THE
CHIEF MATERIAL OF OUR HISTORICAL WRITINGS--VICTORY IS NOT THE ESSENCE OF
THE FIGHT. (Spengler, The Decline of the West)
(tact of command)
....It is not "the" truth or "the" good or "the" upright but "the" Roman or "the" Puritan or "the" Prussian that is a fact. The sum of honor and duty, discipline, resolution is a thing not learned from books, but awakened in the stream of being by a living exemplar...the genuine statesman is
distinguished from the "mere politician", the "player who plays for the pleasure of the game".
Highest of all however is not action, but the ability to command. It is this that takes the individual
out of himself and makes him the center of a world of action. There is one kind of commanding
that makes obedience a proud, free and noble habit. (Davout sic my opinion )
quote" What makes Napoleon, what makes Charles"
That kind Napoleon did not possess. A residue of subaltern outlook prevented him from training
men to be men and not bureau-personnel...but one who, like Caesar and Frederick the Great possesses... (Spengler) next time the rest.
Earlier I pointed out that Charles and Napoleon read the same books, they probably did but
came to different conclusions. Charles never really had to fight for his crown, although he
showed some energy in the Campaign of 1809 , once the 'coordinateur supreme' got the
engine running to his will Charles was easily pushed aside. Charles too like Napoleon did not
have that quality of command but he of course had never been a 'subaltern' unless you
bring Charles father in the picture. So who were Napoleon's and Charles 'subalterns' ?
If Napoleon could not capitalize on his gifted subalterns : Davout, Massena, Lannes Desaix
and perhaps because of his incapacity to understand 'human personality' prevented, these gentlemen very possibly knew Rousseau by heart but also had that particular quality which made them leaders for awhile, Charles, His Imperial Majesty was hardly a "citoyen" to his generals
Charles and most if not all of the 'Etat Major Austrichenne' were also considered to be 'bureau-personnel' and infinitely less 'able to command' and to educate their 'citizen soldiers' after all.
Austrian and French 'citizen soldiers' had poor to highest 'esprit the corps' the willingness
to be freely commanded which the French soldier made into a noble habit and to help rise
its leader (s) compared to 'blind obedience' which the English soldier could never match the Austrian indolent nature either, (but very closely resembled the French because of their 'common idea') were often brutalized by their commanders, for petty infractions, so when the going got
though they lacked the willingness to rise above their station.
I apologize for the length of this post ;)
zu
-
Ciao zu Pferd
Very interesting, but too much difficult for me reply.
Anyway ,i like only the pure strategy (good ideas to win the enemy) and i am less interested in the psicology of men.
All were commanding very strong armies and their victories have been possible also for this reason. ;)
Zucher map is very big,
-
Ciao zu Pferd
Very interesting, but too much difficult for me reply.]
And very difficult for me as well Alfiere ;) but that's Oswald Spangler.
here is what he says about command from the prospective of the mass /regiment
'The well known saying of Robespierre that "the Government of the Revolution is the despotism
of Freedom against tyranny'... expresses more than what it says...' it reveals the deepest fear that
shakes every multitude which, in the presence of grave conjunctures, feels itself "not up to form."
'A regiment that is shaken in its discipline will readily concede to accidental leaders, powers of an
extent and a kind which the legitimate command could never acquire and which if legitimate
would be utterly intolerable.' (Spangler)
From OS's prospective if I may be so bold, it would seem that the Austrian army wasn't alone in being
"not up to form" perhaps the Austrian masses had a chronic case of not being up to form ,whereas all
continental armies seemed to have suffered this from time to time : The French army in Spain, the early
Prussian army, the early English army in Portugal is there a period when the Russian army was not up
to form ? Did they just plodded on like automatons ? perhaps that would explain how indifferent they
were about masses of their dead, bayonet charge all the time no stopping to fire...
was it just acts of desperation like setting fire to their capital city?
when a unit is routing it is shaken in its discipline ? lately I have seen this a lot and even
'avoid the engagement' during a cavalry charge, because if this is the case than JMM is
truly creating an AI that is thinking the problem out. :shock: and what seem to be a glitch in the
game is actually a historical reality rather then theory.
I like this game because of these things in it surely.
ciao
zu
-
Alfiere here is a shot of Regensburg early in the morning, and fairly recent
enjoy...(dreaming the evolution of a river around 2 sides of a village or town and maybe
one through a town with bridges of course :D)
-
Yes,very nice.
I do not understand,but are you interesting to play the variant ? only to know.
For now i have some idea , but not very clear. :mrgreen:
If you are interested, i can step by step explain something.
Main points
We both have the book then we can use book OOBs.
The campaign start with Hausen Teugn Battle ,but Hoenzollern have help of Rosemberg,Vicsey and Lichetestein then
a austrian win,i think and after take note of both losses the campaign continue with free development.
A side use descriptive movements in the forum,having the reference maps,name of villages,roads etc of book,but without posting any map.
Other side (me) use myself a free game to replicate movements and using the fow and advice in the forum when a enemy corp is discovered to agree for some decisions (battle or other).
In practice you have the FOW and I not. :mrgreen: ,but knowing the book no much variants (not much FOW)
If there is a battle , i make a sat map and we play in PBEM .
After the battle, unit by unit,we take note of losses to update own starting OOB and continue the campaign .
hello
-
Ok,understood. ;)
No problem.
Hello
-
Yes,very nice.
I do not understand,but are you interesting to play the variant ? only to know.
]
I'd be interested to play it sure :smile:
-
I think that also if Davout rearguard defeat at Hausen Teugn the campaign does not change much from history.
Charles have to wait I and II corp (Bellegarde and Kolowrath) , still far away and then must wait or move to east.
Then we have anyway a similar decisive battle in history zone (Eggmuhl or near Eggmuhl).
Perhaps not other development possible.
What do you think ?
Hello zu Pferd
-
Hi,
You have been reading your book I see :p ;)
I agree, on the case of Charles having trapped a French Corps and mauled it
certainly added a feather in his cap, however it is but one soon Napoleon will
have all its troops in the area and Charles must regroup and wait for his.
A possible Davout's defeat is an inconvenient setback, the campaign would go on from
there and a battle would logically take place in the area you mentioned considering the
concentration location of both.
-
The question is ....
With heavy Davout defeat at Hausen Teugn , Napo would withdraw his army between Ilm and Abens rivers or continued to have the initiative how in the history?
Difficult to know... :?
Hello
ABANDONED IDEA
-
Difficult to know, however Napoleon without Davout is still some 120,000 men strong, and already
'in' for the most part by the 19th so I would venture that he would still try to destroy Charles army
somewhere where you suggested. :mrgreen: