HistWar
HistWar (English zone) => General discussions => Discussion démarrée par: Marquês de Alorna le 02 mai 2010, 21:11:49 pm
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Dear all,
Sorry if this was already discussed elsewhere (please point me to a past thread if this is the case), but since I've seen that a lot of people praise the LOP mechanism implemented in HW-LG instead of "Victory Points", I'd like to say something about some of its disadvantages that sometimes destroy the realism of the game.
From a "GAME" perspective it makes all sense to have LOPs as already implemented. However, from a "SIMULATION" perspective I have some doubts.
Some debate has been taking place about the need for a Victory Points system, which forces players to implement it out of the game. So I will not repeat their arguments.
Instead, I would like to address the effects on morale. Two days ago, when playing the Amstetten scenario with the French, and since I'm still learning the game, I have committed a mistake, which allowed 3 enemy units (2 Hussar + 1 Infantry) to control the LOP of the French army. I have immediately dispatched all the cavalry (2 Cuirassier + 2 Hussar + 1 Horse Arty) to take the position occupied by the enemy. But the effect of loosing the LOP was so heavy that the charges of the Cuirassiers were always defeated by the enemy Hussars (note: the following day I did not commit the same mistake and the Cuirassiers could easily defeat the very same Hussar units in all encounters). Then the French Hussars were also defeated. Lannes's infantry was also routed in a fight that took place kilometers away from cavalry battle!!!
My question is: is this realistic? I don't think so.
Were LOP important in Napoleonic battles. No doubt. The authors are unanimous about that. But does this effect on morale translate that importance? But this would be mainly to grant supply routes (strategic level), to grant an avenue for reinforcements (grand-tactical level) and to allow an ordered retreat in case of defeat (grand-tactical level).
No doubt the troops could become more hesitant upon knowledge that the LOP was not controlled anymore by their side. But would they often know that except when all was already hopeless, when they wanted to retreat and the path was blocked (which could force a surrender)? If commanders had difficulty knowing what was happening on the battlefield, what about common soldiers? Even if the commanders knew the true situation, of course they would keep it secret as long as possible.
Returning to my example of the Amstetten scenario, how could Lanne's infantry know that control of the LOP had been lost so many kilometers away? This is simply not logical and in my opinion deserves some thought on how the LOP control effects are treated in HW-LG.
Regards,
António
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That my friend, is a very good argument and deserves some further discussion. In our pbem battles, it has almost become the standard battleplan to get one or both (we always use 2) LOP's as quickly as possible. However, this may also have been the tactics in real life. As for VP's, we use them over at nbc in our pbem/MP campaign battles. Here is a screen of one drawn up by our CinC, Gunner24.
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You are right... The present system controling the LoP isn't robustness.. so for the next patch (1c), I worked on this procedure again.
The method seems more realistic... that said, you have always to protect your LoP with several units (4 ou 5).
Some ENY may not take the control...
No doubt the troops could become more hesitant upon knowledge that the LOP was not controlled anymore by their side. But would they often know that except when all was already hopeless, when they wanted to retreat and the path was blocked (which could force a surrender)? If commanders had difficulty knowing what was happening on the battlefield, what about common soldiers? Even if the commanders knew the true situation, of course they would keep it secret as long as possible.
Returning to my example of the Amstetten scenario, how could Lanne's infantry know that control of the LOP had been lost so many kilometers away? This is simply not logical and in my opinion deserves some thought on how the LOP control effects are treated in HW-LG.
hummm... how? It's not displayed in the game but you have to imagine the army with the chariots, the ammunition.. several hundred of different devices and the people moving between the different sectors (ammunition, prisoners with the guards, seriously injured person .. )
JMM
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hummm... how? It's not displayed in the game but you have to imagine the army with the chariots, the ammunition.. several hundred of different devices and the people moving between the different sectors (ammunition, prisoners with the guards, seriously injured person .. )
JMM
JMM, I think that your argument is not convincing enough. First of all, I doubt that many soldiers had a clear picture of the commander's intent and so the news about friendly units (specially elite) being defeated would have much more impact than the news about one or two enemy units being seen at some point on a road kilometers away. You must agree that the impact of LOP control in HW-LG is very exagerated, which makes its meaning very "game"-like.
ATTN: This is no offense to you or to HW-LG which is an wonderful game! These aspects could be easily tweaked.
In my opinion the LOP control should not have the impact on morale that it currently has. In fact it would not schock me if it had no impact at all on the morale of units.
Since LOPs are the default direction followed by fleeing units, a blocked LOP path should increase the probability of unit surrender and becoming prisoner, which is already an incentive to control the enemy's LOP. It should also impact the statistics at the end of the game (e.g. number of prisoners, extent of victory, etc.). When battles continue the following day, it should also have impact on the supplies (I'm not sure if supplies are modeled in the game already). This would suffice to make players willing to control the enemy LOP and in a much more realistic way.
Regards,
António
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I have to agree with Marquês. In fact, the only issues that should affect line troops morale should be very local factors: being flanked, overwhelmed, attacked by enemy guard units, commanding officer killed, out of ammo, or seeing friendly (specially elite) units routing ("La Guarde recule").
I can accept the effect of LOP on morale, but this being a simulation, it is IMHO exagerated.
Regards
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After giving this some thought since my earlier post, I am leaning more toward JMM's interpretation of the effect. However they may have found out, it is a historical reality that when troops became aware, by whatever means, of the presence of the enemy in their rear, it had a large impact on moral. Maybe there is an argument that the effect in HLG is too big, although I am not sure.
Although at Waterloo, it was the Guards routing not the loss of an LOP, the effect was very quickly transmitted through the French army with a full scale rout following. It isn't unreasonable to suppose the presence of the enemy in the rear, cutting the armies LOP, would transmit with some rapidity.
Maybe there is someone who has done some research and can post citing sources, not opinions, as to the effect in question?
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After giving this some thought since my earlier post, I am leaning more toward JMM's interpretation of the effect. However they may have found out, it is a historical reality that when troops became aware, by whatever means, of the presence of the enemy in their rear, it had a large impact on moral. Maybe there is an argument that the effect in HLG is too big, although I am not sure.
Maybe there is someone who has done some research and can post citing sources, not opinions, as to the effect in question?
Just one more opinion, taking my Amstetten battle as example =)...
No matter the effect that LOP control may have, do you think that 2 Cuirassier + 2 Hussar units + 1HA would rout before 2 enemy Hussar units plus 1 stuck infantry unit? In my opinion they would instead know that their superior power would grant the LOP being retaken with very limited effort effort.
Regards,
António
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Just one more opinion, taking my Amstetten battle as example =)...
No matter the effect that LOP control may have, do you think that 2 Cuirassier + 2 Hussar units + 1HA would rout before 2 enemy Hussar units plus 1 stuck infantry unit? In my opinion they would instead know that their superior power would grant the LOP being retaken with very limited effort effort.
hehe, after the battle of Heilsberg, where d'Espagne's Cuirassiers were used badly for an insane frontal assault over unsuitable terrian against a fortified position, they were so frightened and discouraged during the next few weeks, that in the next engagement the cuirassiers fled out of the woods, the supporting units formed line to receive the enemy, who routed them in the first place, but noone came...they were so unnerved that they just panicked without reason! :roll:
CvC
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hehe, after the battle of Heilsberg, where d'Espagne's Cuirassiers were used badly for an insane frontal assault over unsuitable terrian against a fortified position, they were so frightened and discouraged during the next few weeks, that in the next engagement the cuirassiers fled out of the woods, the supporting units formed line to receive the enemy, who routed them in the first place, but noone came...they were so unnerved that they just panicked without reason! :roll:
CvC
But, dear Count, my Cuirassiers were still fresh when they uselessly charged the enemy Hussars =).
António
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In fairness, I have seen the odd inexplicable rout myself but something may have been going on in the calculations I wasn't aware of.
This subject has peaked my interest, so I've set off to do a little research myself. This is what I've found so far.
Napoleon would often employ a maneuver of envelopment - pinning the foe's attention with a detachment while the bulk of the army swept against the hostile lines of communications to sever the enemy's links with his bases. ... On occasion, Napoleon would merge features of these two classic strategies." (David Chandler - "Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars" p 19)
His favorite strategy was to envelop one of the enemy's army's flanks and threaten its rear and communications, forcing it either to retire hurriedly or to turn and fight at a disadvantage.
I haven't drawn any conclusions from these sources yet, early days :?: :?: :?:
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But, dear Count, my Cuirassiers were still fresh when they uselessly charged the enemy Hussars =).
António
the engagement I was talking about was 4 days AFTER the disaster at Heilsberg ;) - they were very fresh there too...it was just a little story to show overall morale effects in reality...even the "tanks" of that age, could easily be routed when they were frightened or simply had a "bad day"!
CvC
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an overall summary on the importance of LOPs (in general):
how were messages about everything sent in those days? - by horse, messanger, carriage..whatever...how would those messages reach the army HQs? - via the roads designated LOPs...not only lines of Operation, but also Communication...
when an army lost these lines, it was on its own...no more reinforcements...no more orders from the emperor in Vienna, Moscow, Berlin (King)....and no more line of retreat....
the entire baggage train is lost...which means all the ammunition and food is gone...maybe the reserve artillery is captured as well...and not to forget! - the personal belongings of the CinC...which is always bad for morale, because he'll be less than pleased about that and his staff will have to pay for his moods!
if you look at the Napoleonic battles: why form a rear guard at all? - why post the reserves to the rear?...because when the army was beaten the main/last task for the CinC was to save as much of his army intact as possible to fight another day! - but to do so...he needed an open line of retreat! - better known as LOP! - many people died during the final stages of the battle to defend those LOPs and to give the rest of the army enough time to retreat (hopefully in good order, if not, give it enough time to run, without being chased by light cavalry!)
and if you turn the flank of an army, like Napoleon did so very often (if you compare Waterloo with Wagram, you will see that it is basically the same plan!), it was usually forced to withdraw in order to not be cut of the LOPs...
so if you want you could also say: apart from the destruction of the enemy army, the LOPs were the main thing battles were fought over! - because any maneuver to cut off the enemy from the rear, outmaneuver him , or isolate him always involved the basic idea of cutting or disrupting the enemy's LOPs!
CvC
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I understand your arguments, Count. But you are talking about a strategical level, involving whole armies and measured in days/weeks. But how about the tactical, "immediate", brigade vs brigade level, measured in minutes/hours ?
I think that you are a military professional, IIRC. I do not know if you are or were involved in actual fighting. But at squad level, do you really think the immediate concern of a soldier is if his army's line of retreat is secure ? Or rather if his friends are being killed while his unit is surrounded and out of ammo (even if the rest of the army is secure ??)
IMHO, the loss of LOP should have some effect, but not an immediate effect in units fighting miles away, out of sight of their rear.
Regards
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I am a special forces soldier, and I study military history at the moment, and probably an officer soon to be...and if one thing is certain on a battlefield...as a soldier you want to be sure that you will be able to survive when you are forced to retreat!!!! - Fight to the final bullet...well this happens rarely, if at all! - so yes...the most important thing, when you realize that you will lose the battle is the knowledge that you will be able to retreat into safety and put some distance between you and the enemy - which is impossible with the LOPs being cut off! - it was back then...and is still now! (helicopters only change so much...)
CvC
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The British military historian and theorist Bassill H. Liddell Hart wrote, "...in the campaign of 1809 Napoleon is again seen trying, at Landshut and Vienna, to manoeuvre onto the enemy's rear.
Ronald E.M. Goodman (Molossian Naval Academy, training reference)
Turning maneuvers are indirect approaches that attempt to swing wide around an enemy's flank to so threaten an enemy's supply and communication lines that the enemy is forced to abandon a strong position or be cut off and encircled. Napoleon was a master of the turning movement, using it many times between 1796 and 1812. Robert E. Lee used the maneuver at the Second Battle of Bull Run (1862); the German drive to the French coast in 1940 was another example.
I'm still trolling for reliable info. In support of the Count, the reference to Landshut & Bull Run, can only be in a tactical nature of the set piece battle. Whereas the German drive to the French coast would have been strategic. From what I am learning, attacking LOP/LOC's was done on a larger scale strategically and on a smaller battlefield scale, tactically. As to the tactical effect in battle, I have already given my opinion but my understanding of the effect of this maneuver can only be enhanced by the opinion of others.
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Dear friends
I did not say that LOPs are not important. I agree that they are of utmost importance and most often they are the tactical objective sought by commanders. What I am questioning is the way this reality is forced to emerge in HW-LG. I cannot recall an historical example of an entire army being routed because the LOP was taken 10 Km away by 1 or 2 regiments.
Besides, since commanders were aware of the importance of LOPs, these would sometimes be used as a bait for the enemy (this was a risk component of the tactical plan). The way HW-LG is now implemented makes it impossible to recover a LOP once it is taken by one or two enemy units, even if you send an entire corps to recover them. This is my point and the reason why I suggest to take LOP into account as an effect on routed units with their path blocked, and on the final statistics. This will allow you to use the LOP as bait, and if you know what you're doing you may later be able to see the Sun of Austerlitz shining for you.
Regards,
António
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Dear Marques, firstly, I don't think anyone has formerly welcomed you to the Forum, so welcome!!!
Welcome also, are new thoughts and ideas that challenge us all, so you'll fit in well here. Please don't be put off by our sometimes challenging nature, we do it to each other all the time. The Count and I have had some lively debates.
The way HW-LG is now implemented makes it impossible to recover a LOP once it is taken by one or two enemy units, even if you send an entire corps to recover them.
Have to disagree with you here though. Gunner24 and I fought a pbem battle and we both rescued our LOP's TWICE. We called it the "LOP JIG" (dance). What we have discovered about HLG is it's depth and intricacy, sometimes there are things going on that influence other things, giving an outcome you didn't expect. It never ceases to surprise us.
Keep throwing new ideas though, I love em. :smile: :smile: :smile:
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Dear friend,
Dear Marques, firstly, I don't think anyone has formerly welcomed you to the Forum, so welcome!!!
Welcome also, are new thoughts and ideas that challenge us all, so you'll fit in well here. Please don't be put off by our sometimes challenging nature, we do it to each other all the time. The Count and I have had some lively debates.
Have to disagree with you here though. Gunner24 and I fought a pbem battle and we both rescued our LOP's TWICE. We called it the "LOP JIG" (dance). What we have discovered about HLG is it's depth and intricacy, sometimes there are things going on that influence other things, giving an outcome you didn't expect. It never ceases to surprise us.
Keep throwing new ideas though, I love em. :smile: :smile: :smile:
Firstly, thank you very much for your words. Of course I have exagerated by saying "Corps", I just wanted to illustrate my feeling. Anyway, I think it is an issue to be thought, and maybe someone gets inspired an finds a better way to treat LOP, or a way to improve it without leaving the current model.
Regards,
António
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I do think JMM has evolving thoughts on this issue.
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The LOP is an abstraction, but I think it is worthwhile. It forces you to protect your rear areas. I don't think this is exaggerated, except that I do think the effect should not be too significant unless a reasonably substantial force is threatening the LOP. It's relatively easy in the game for a cav unit or two to get behind enemy lines, sometimes they even rout in that direction, then rally, then head for the LOP.
But if a reasonably substantial force is in your rear areas, then yes, I think it should have a very substantial effect on the battle. This is historical and reasonable.
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Ges, never mind posting, get that damned pbem file back, you won after all :( :( :(
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Didn't you get my message? The internet pirates must have stolen the file. I've sent a replacement.
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Hook, we need a chat box on HLG Forum
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Hook, we need a chat box on HLG Forum
there was one...but noone ever used it :twisted:
CvC
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Count, I mean one like we have over at nbc, it sits in the upper corner and is always on, visible to all. I remember the one we had, it was unwieldy and awkward to use. Take a peak at nbc's, we use it continuously. It's just an idea.
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Count, I mean one like we have over at nbc, it sits in the upper corner and is always on, visible to all. I remember the one we had, it was unwieldy and awkward to use. Take a peak at nbc's, we use it continuously. It's just an idea.
ah ok...I know what you mean...don't know...I guess since the other one wasn't used.... :?
CvC
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See Marques, just look what you started :p :p :evil: :evil: :smile: :smile: :mrgreen: :twisted: ;) ;) ;)
The Count loves smilies
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The LOP is an abstraction, but I think it is worthwhile. It forces you to protect your rear areas. I don't think this is exaggerated, except that I do think the effect should not be too significant unless a reasonably substantial force is threatening the LOP. It's relatively easy in the game for a cav unit or two to get behind enemy lines, sometimes they even rout in that direction, then rally, then head for the LOP.
But if a reasonably substantial force is in your rear areas, then yes, I think it should have a very substantial effect on the battle. This is historical and reasonable.
Yes, I basically agree with what you wrote.
Regards,
António
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I was just thinking how great it is that we can even have these discussions. I really never thought I'd see a game like this. It still has some rough edges, but there is nothing else that comes close, and if JM can keep refining it, it will be the ultimate Napoleonic era battle game.
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Interesting topic... I hope a lot of people will comment on.
Do you have an example where an army lost his Lines of Operation?
That said, the new calculation (patch 01c) is better than the initial one. Some units can keep the LoP because, in the new process, HW takes account of topology, so it's more difficult to take the control.
JMM
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Interesting topic... I hope a lot of people will comment on.
Do you have an example where an army lost his Lines of Operation?
That said, the new calculation (patch 01c) is better than the initial one. Some units can keep the LoP because, in the new process, HW takes account of topology, so it's more difficult to take the control.
JMM
Vandamme à Külm. ;) But it's a Corps not an Army.
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Vandamme à Külm. ;) But it's a Corps not an Army.
Right... ;)
Consequence :?:
JMM
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Interesting topic... I hope a lot of people will comment on.
Here is my point of view:
If an army is cut off from its LOP, even if the latter is not captured, the penalty should be the same.
By "cut of its LOP", I mean that a substantial force (not easy to calculate, i concede) is inserted between a LOP and its army.
In fact, always from my point of view, in this case the supply will be intercepted.
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Voici mon point de vue :
Si une armée est coupée de sa LOP, même si celle-ci n'est pas capturée, la pénalité devrait être la même.
Par "coupée de sa LOP", je veux dire qu'une force substantielle (pas aisé à calculer, je le concède) s'insére entre une LOP et son armée.
En effet, toujours de mon point de vue, dans ce cas les approvisionnements seront interceptés.
GP.
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In the case of Külm, it is necessary that the Prussian reinforcements can arrive in the back of Vandamme (what should be possible if one foresees the reinforcement to - 500m of the French map side) and that the French morale doesn't immediately fall (the entrance of the reinforcements cheek on the 2 LOP that only make one). It would be necessary to foresee a delay before the decrease of morale is efficient and permit to Vandamme to immediately react with the intact strengths thus. The delay could be of 30 minutes.
Prussians arriving, one can think that they are not in order of battle and that they need a little times to organize themselves.
Yves
Dans le cas de Külm, il faut que les renforts prussiens puissent arriver dans le dos de Vandamme (ce qui devrait être possible si on prévoit le renfort à - 500m du bord de carte français) et que le moral français ne chute pas immédiatement (l'entrée des renforts joue sur les 2 LOP qui n'en font qu'une). Il faudrait prévoir un délai avant que la baisse de moral soit effective et permettre ainsi à Vandamme de réagir immédiatement avec des forces intactes. Le délai pourrait être de 30 minutes.
Les Prussiens arrivant, on peut penser qu'ils ne sont pas en ordre de bataille et qu'il leur faut un peu de temps pour s'organiser.
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Very interesting topic......I wonder, is the "problem" that there is only two of these points, so if you lose one you are in VERY serious trouble, lose them both and it is of course all over.......if there were say 4 of them, losing one would have an impact, but not so bad.
In the end, if the LOPs are correctly protected, they should not be lost, but it does look very strange to me with one or two units in the rear guarding them. I look forward to the new system and how that works.
NBC use the VPs for locations to "add" something to the battlefield, if one side digs in over in there deployment zone the other side can take the VPs in the map centre without cost.
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I am leaning toward a system where the Army still loses moral but the time factor is extended. What I mean to say is that the troops in the immediate area would lose moral almost instantly but the troops farther away on the front line would lose it after a longer period of time. This would then have taken into account the longer time for the news to reach them. However this may be difficult to program, I don't know.
When all is said and done, an Army losing it's lines of communication should have a devasting effect because as the research I posted earlier illustrates, that Army has only two choices, "Flee or turn and fight at a disadvantage"
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Maybe (MAYBE!!!) the effect on morale should:
1) Not be immediate, but should increase as time passes during which the enemy force has control over the LOP. Regaining the LOP should reverse the process.
2) Depend on the CEH ratio between the force that looses the LOP and the enemy forces that are blocking it.
Regards,
António
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1) Not be immediate, but should increase as time passes during which the enemy force has control over the LOP. Regaining the LOP should reverse the process.
Agreed, and as time passes, spread out incrementaly over the army, Regaining your LOP does however reverse the process already.
2) Depend on the CEH ratio between the force that looses the LOP and the enemy forces that are blocking it.
Agreed
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And maybe the effect should only be taken into account when all LOP avenues are closed.
António
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And maybe the effect should only be taken into account when all LOP avenues are closed.
JMM has already made the effect different for losing one LOP as opposed to two, and I feel that is correct. There should definately be an effect from losing just one LOP.
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JMM has already made the effect different for losing one LOP as opposed to two, and I feel that is correct. There should definately be an effect from losing just one LOP.
Ok, agreed.
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This is an interesting topic,,and very deep.
In my opinion, in many games, not necessarily sims, one uses victory points, or like here LOP, to help determine winners and losers. However, in reality, the threatening of, or breaking of LOP by maneuver was done to bring an enemy to battle in order to defeat it and bring an end to the war. lol,, prolly too simply put.
To threaten a flank in a strategic campaign vs in a tactical\grand tactical battle are a bit different,, but perhaps have the same ending. In the first, the purpose is to maneuver an enemy into a position of our choice, or force the enemy to combat. In a strategic game, its purpose is to defeat in detail, by maneuver, ones enemy in combat.
To use LOP and victory points tends to create artificial situations, and is a real problem especially in solo games,,
The Count's example shows this when a single unit or so, can cause so much problems for an whole army... This, I think is what needs be dealt with.. and if a larger force has managed to maneuver to the rear and sit upon ones lines of supply, theoretically, either he has left darned few troops in the line of battle, or the battle has already been decided and its only a matter of finishing the game. If it becomes a viable tactic to weaken ones main battle line in order to maneuver a large force onto supply lines without combat, then this becomes a nice way for one to perhaps abuse the purpose of a game. If the AI does this,, it is even worse.
In a good game, this should only happen against an inexperienced player, who does not know how to use his cav for scouting etc.
In my mind, this tactic would be good,but risky, if the end results were to truly bring this force into action against the enemy on either his flank or rear,,, not sit on the LOC\LOP and force a morale decision... especially with a truly small force as the Count described.
I recognize that some mechanism must be used to create winners and losers,,especially in solo mode. I imagine JMM has already included many factors in this decision such as troop loses,unit and army morale. This is an attempt to include army position in this decision, I would guess. So,,, balance is the key,,and am looking forward to how he deals with this in the next patch.
anvil
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There is only one rule: Always guard your LOP. Even if it's just a single cavalry unit, and even in a solo game, where *currently* the AI orders don't cause the enemy to advance that far, because sometimes you'll get one or more enemy units pursuing one of your units to the rear, and you can end up losing control of your LOPs.
I got caught by this one recently in tutorial 3. You don't expect the enemy to advance, but this time he did. Turns out it was a diversionary attack which I saw in the replay. He actually got a unit past my line of troops, and since the enemy in tutorial 3 never attacks, I didn't have someone guarding my LOP. It was a mad scramble trying to catch and destroy him, even though it was an infantry unit.
You've been warned.
Hook
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I learned this rule the hard way. Not only do I keep a reserve at my LOP, most of our nbc battles have 2 LOP's and it's common over there to see some detached cavalry units between the 2 LOP's